



NGO participation in global governance institutions: international and domestic drivers of engagement

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Abstract

Global governance institutions (GGIs) increasingly rely upon NGO involvement for expertise, promotion of rules and standards, and democratic legitimacy. Yet NGO participation in GGIs is unevenly distributed by country of origin. This paper examines patterns of NGO participation in GGIs, and how participation is shaped by incentives and pressures at global and national levels. First, we map NGO participation by country of origin across 42 GGIs based on the roles that GGIs grant to NGOs and by variations in domestic conditions of income level and political regime type. Second, to delve more deeply into domestic factors, we provide an exploratory statistical regression based on NGO participation in two major GGIs, the UN Global Compact on corporate social responsibility and the UNFCCC Conferences of Parties on climate change. We find evidence that participation patterns reflect both the varying institutional design of GGIs and NGO capacity linked to domestic conditions. We observe that NGOs with constrained capacity due to domestic factors gravitate toward GGIs that offer the most significant roles for NGOs, with the greatest opportunity to influence policy. We suggest that domestic civil society factors beyond level of economic development and regime type shape NGO participation at the global level. Analysis of this wide-ranging set of GGIs provides more general confirmation of patterns of NGO engagement in global governance previously identified in studies limited to particular issue sectors or cases.

Keywords Global governance · Non-governmental organizations · Advocacy organizations · Participation · Political opportunity structure · UN Global Compact · UNFCCC

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Introduction

The participation of NGOs in global governance institutions (GGIs) has inspired optimism among many observers about resolving the world's most pressing issues, ranging from HIV/AIDS to climate change and deforestation. NGOs participate in global institutions to make use of rules, standards, and information to leverage effects in their home countries. Secretary-general of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon has highlighted the role of NGOs in formulating and achieving the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, stating, 'Without the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups, no initiative, however visionary, can be fully achieved' (UN News 2016). However, NGO participation is uneven across states and GGIs. Describing and explaining how NGOs from different countries participate in GGIs offers insights into domestic and international opportunities and obstacles to NGO participation at the global level—an essential precursor to NGOs' ability to influence global governance.

We bring scholarship from the global governance and comparative politics literatures together to show how factors at both the international and domestic levels shape NGO participation in GGIs. Scholars such as Tallberg et al. (2018), Raustiala (1997), and Gordenker and Weiss (1995) have found that greater access for NGOs in GGIs leads to greater NGO influence—or what we call *potential* influence (Boström and Hallström 2010). Yet this relationship does not fully explain the drivers of variation in NGO participation [what others call 'involvement' (Halpin and Fraussen 2017)] across those GGIs that officially permit NGO access. We propose two additional dynamics. First, GGIs with a more open political opportunity structure that grant more significant roles to NGOs in consultation and decision making (and thus greater potential influence) also attract greater numbers of NGO participants. Second, on the domestic side, scholars have long argued that political and resource configurations shape the capacity and influence of NGOs as advocacy organizations (McAdam 1982; Smith and Wiest 2005; Tarrow 2011, 2005). We anticipate that elements of the domestic political opportunity structure (signified in this article by levels of democracy, wealth, and the civil society environment) drive variations in the distribution of NGO participation in GGIs by country of origin. The limitations of scarce resources and constrained political environments force NGOs to make hard choices about participation. Synthesizing these global and domestic factors, we hypothesize that NGOs from challenging domestic contexts possess fewer opportunities to participate at the global level and therefore conserve their efforts to focus on GGIs that afford the greatest opportunity for influence. In this way, we extend and then empirically test a basic premise of Keck and Sikkink's (1998) 'boomerang pattern,' in which advocacy groups unable to influence their domestic government seek leverage internationally.

To investigate which factors shape the range of advocacy organizations participating in global governance, we map and analyze patterns of participation by NGOs from different countries across a number of GGIs. As noted above, we argue that incentives for and barriers to NGO participation exist both at global



and at domestic levels, confirming the importance of domestic political opportunity structures (POS) and extending the opportunity structure concept to the GGI itself. First, we look at the ‘demand’ side of the equation, considering whether the range of roles granted to NGOs within a GGI affects NGOs’ likelihood of participating. We use an original dataset including detailed participation data on 7528 worldwide NGO participants in 42 distinct GGIs to compare patterns of participation by NGOs from high-, medium-, and low-income states and from states with more democratic or authoritarian political regimes. We find that NGOs gravitate toward GGIs that offer them more significant roles and therefore higher potential for influence, regardless of their origin country’s income or regime type. Yet NGOs from wealthier and more democratic states are less prone to cluster in GGIs offering high influence potential than those from poorer, less democratic states. Thus, the demand side driven by GGIs’ opportunity structure has less impact on these relatively advantaged NGOs.

Next, we examine the ‘supply’ side of NGOs from each state using an exploratory regression analysis of NGO participation in two GGIs for which over time data are available: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC). This analysis further supports our contention that features of a country’s domestic POS shape NGO capacity, helping to explain variation in GGI participation. As expected, we find that levels of democracy and wealth are positively correlated with participation. Paradoxically, however, the analysis also suggests that more hostile domestic civil society environments, offering fewer options for NGO consultation and participation in national-level policy processes, drive NGOs to ‘go global’ and participate in GGI venues in higher numbers than do more hospitable civil society environments. In this way, our finding that NGOs from more hostile domestic contexts are more likely to mobilize globally echoes the ‘boomerang pattern’ identified by Keck and Sikkink, but deepens our understanding by demonstrating where NGOs are mostly likely to focus their energies. More broadly, our analytical framework integrates factors at multiple levels to examine a rich, cross-sectoral dataset and demonstrates patterns of NGO engagement across global governance institutions that are similar to those identified by previous narrower analyses.

Theorizing political opportunities: NGO participation in GGIs

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have charted a marked increase in the roles of non-state actors such as NGOs in international relations (Charnovitz 1997; Mathews 1997; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Florini 2000). In keeping with the special issue, we define NGOs as advocacy organizations pursuing principled goals and public benefits, often using a mix of domestic and global actions (Dellmuth and Bloodgood, this special issue). The scholarly literature generally has separated the study of international NGOs (INGOs) operating globally and interest groups active at the domestic level, when in fact many NGOs pursue advocacy at both levels simultaneously. For example, scholars have focused on the key role that INGOs have played in the



design and proliferation of GGIs (Pattberg 2005; Boström and Hallström 2010; Willetts 2011; Wong 2012; Stephen and Zürn 2014). The participation of domestically rooted NGOs—particularly those beyond the West—in GGIs has received less attention, with notable recent exceptions (Bexell et al. 2010; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2017; Hanegraaff et al. 2015; Smith and Wiest 2005; Tarrow 2005). The literature so far has tended either to examine how domestic POS characteristics (such as wealth or democracy) affect NGO or interest group participation by country (Hanegraaff et al. 2015, e.g., Smith and Wiest 2005), or how GGI access rules affect NGO participation regardless of country of origin (Boström and Hallström 2010; Tallberg et al. 2018). In practice, domestic and international opportunity structures both shape the behavior of NGOs as advocacy groups and are potentially crucial in influencing which voices are heard in global institutions. We propose examining the *interaction* between the POS at both of these two levels to see how NGO participation in GGIs offering roles of varying influence potentials is mediated by varying elements of the domestic environment.

Our mapping of NGO participation in GGIs is a unique effort to capture broad trends in NGO participation in global governance beyond singular thematic areas such as the environment (Najam et al. 2004; Raustiala 1997), climate (Böhmelt, Koubi and Bernauer 2014; Roger, Hale and Andonova 2017), fisheries (Dellmuth et al. 2018), international trade (Hanegraaff et al. 2015), or humanitarian action (Gordenker and Weiss 1995). To explain patterns of NGO participation in GGIs, we explore several factors of the domestic and international POS that shape and constrain advocacy organizations in GGIs. As noted above, we hypothesize that in general NGOs are attracted to participate in GGIs that offer the greatest potential for influence and that this trend is likely to be most apparent among NGOs facing challenging domestic environments. We elaborate on how this argument advances the existing scholarly literature in the two following sections.

Political opportunity structure within GGIs

Institutional environments provide incentives or disincentives that shape NGO participation, even at the global level (Bloodgood and Clough 2017; Heiss and Johnson 2016). This set of incentives, regardless of the level of governance, can be conceptualized as a ‘political opportunity structure’ which Tarrow defines as the ‘consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources’ to act to achieve their goals (Tarrow 2011). Within GGIs, the POS may vary as NGOs may play a more or less consequential role depending on the institutional context and rules of access established by the GGI itself (Halpin and Fraussen 2017). Does the GGI allow NGOs to participate as full members, or on a limited, ad hoc, or ‘by invitation only’ basis (Willetts 2000)? Can NGOs participate in the development and revision of GGI rules and standards? There is a great deal of variation across GGIs in the formal and informal rules of access and rule-making for NGOs. Even within United Nations processes, access for NGOs varies considerably across agencies and



meetings (Krut 1997; Willetts 2011), while the World Trade Organization has historically been closed to NGO access (Nanz and Steffek 2004, pp. 325–326).

Dellmuth and Bloodgood note that ‘democracy in GGIs [is] conceptualized as relatively generous access rules,’ but suggest that access does not necessarily translate into influence for advocacy organizations (Dellmuth and Bloodgood, this special issue). We agree and argue that NGO access is only the first step toward gaining influence within GGIs. We are using the concept of ‘influence’ in a slightly different way than commonly invoked in the interest group literature where influence often refers to control over political outcomes (Dür 2008; Dür and de Bièvre 2007; Lowery et al. 2008). By focusing on *potential* influence through the range of roles available for NGOs, we consider how a GGI may empower NGOs to shape the design and implementation of global governance, rather than the outcome of that governance effort. To assess potential influence, we consider the consultation and decision-making roles made available to NGOs with a GGI. NGOs may be influential in shaping the rules and standards that are adopted, offer critical expertise on the issue being addressed (Böhmelt 2013, p. 57; Clark 2001; Raustiala 1997; Tallberg et al. 2018), serve as intermediaries for accessing important social networks and communities, or engage in monitoring other actors to ensure the effectiveness of the initiative (Boström and Hallström 2010).

We hypothesize that opportunities for NGOs to play more significant governance roles within GGIs should lead to more NGO participation, especially for lower-capacity NGOs that cannot afford to participate in all venues. As NGOs engage with GGIs, they attempt to make the greatest progress toward influencing global policy while conserving scarce organizational resources. In other words, they try to obtain the ‘biggest bang for their buck.’ As they look for opportunities and manage constraints, we argue that NGOs engage in venue shopping—participating in those governance institutions where they expect to achieve the greatest impact (Dellmuth and Bloodgood, this special issue). NGOs from less democratic and less economically developed states may face greater limitations in personnel and budgets and may be able to participate only in a few GGIs. Thus, we contend that a GGI that offers participating NGOs more significant roles and potential for influence may be seen as a worthwhile venue, even for those NGOs that possess relatively low capacity.

Domestic political opportunity structures

Another set of factors that clearly shape NGO participation in GGIs relates to domestic conditions for NGO development—the domestic POS, broadly defined, as emphasized elsewhere by others (Smith and Wiest 2005). While organizational capacity—in terms of expertise, personnel, and financial resources—varies among individual NGOs, we can generalize about domestic environments that are more or less conducive to NGO development.

Social movement scholars first articulated the importance of more open or closed POS on advocacy groups’ ability to locate elite allies, use political cleavages, and respond to repression (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 2011, 2005), while the resource mobilization school highlighted the role of material conditions on advocacy (McCarthy



and Zald 1977). More recent research has shown that states vary significantly in how they enable or obstruct social activism—the legal context may be more or less permissive (Bloodgood et al. 2014), funding more or less abundant (Cooley and Ron 2002; Sundstrom 2006), the state may be a partner or opponent (Gomez and Harris 2015; Hsu et al. 2017), and social organizations may have a longer or shorter history of development (Smith and Wiest 2005). Material constraints on NGOs certainly impede their ability to engage globally (Boström and Hallström 2010; Hanegraaff et al. 2015).

In our analyses below, we focus on a few key elements of domestic POS that are measurable cross-nationally with available datasets. We examine the factors of political regime openness, economic wealth, and civil society environment. Consistent with previous studies, we expect that the level of democracy in a domestic political regime will influence NGOs' ability to mobilize globally, with less democratic circumstances likely to dampen NGO participation. In addition, we anticipate that access to material resources, which we measure with the rough proxy variable of income levels, will increase NGOs' capacity to participate in GGIs, with more resource availability allowing more frequent mobilization across borders. Finally, we expect that a more precise measure of the environment for civil society organizations, including access to domestic decision-making processes, will show that a more empowering civil society environment will encourage more NGO participation in GGIs.

Ultimately, it is the layering of factors at the international and domestic levels that profoundly shape NGO participation. To restate our expectations, highlighting the interaction of factors, we expect that NGOs from unfavorable domestic circumstances will be most attracted to participating in GGIs that offer the greatest potential for influence as they have scarce resources to expend on advocacy at the global level.

Methodology

Our analysis of NGO participation in GGIs seeks to capture a broad cross section of institutional types and issue areas in global governance. To achieve this, we constructed an original dataset using Held and Hale's (2011) compilation of transgovernmental initiatives and the York University Compendium of ethics codes (McKague and Cragg 2007) to develop a list of GGIs that include non-governmental organizations as participants.¹ The relevant GGIs from Held and Hale and the York Compendium yielded a total of 126 initiatives (see Appendix 2). From this comprehensive set of GGIs, we identified 93 GGIs that claimed to include NGOs as key actors. A subset of 42 initiatives provide detailed NGO

¹ Held and Hale aim to provide a comprehensive overview of transnational governance. York Compendium focuses on GGIs that govern private sector actors in issue areas ranging from the environment to corruption and human rights (McKague and Cragg 2007).



participation data publicly.² We then coded NGO participants for these 42 initiatives to link them to country of origin. Similar to Tallberg et al. (2018, p. 221), in our coding, an ‘NGO’ encompasses any organization recognized as such by the GGI, capturing a wide array of groups engaged in advocacy ranging from human rights organizations to business associations and even GONGOs, but excluding for-profit corporations. Country of origin for each NGO participant was determined based on information from GGI directories, when available, or organizations’ websites for the addresses of the main office.³

We examine the institutional context that NGOs face both within GGIs and domestically. To this end, we use our dataset in two ways. First, we consider the POS of the GGI as creating incentives for NGO participation. We coded each GGI with regard to the types of governance roles granted to NGOs, and their potential to influence the GGI’s formulation and implementation of global rules and standards (see Appendix 1). For example, NGO roles may include consultation as experts or as stakeholders, commenting or voting on proposals, and monitoring of rules and standards. Each additional role adds a point to our scoring system for potential influence. With these data, we carry out a descriptive mapping exercise to compare rates of participation by NGOs in different kinds of GGIs. In addition, we use the data generated across the 42 GGIs in an exploratory manner to see whether NGOs from countries with different income levels, regime types, and domestic civil society environments cluster in certain types of initiatives.⁴

Although variation in GGI design and data restrictions make multilevel modeling of domestic factors affecting participation infeasible, we select two institutions for more rigorous analysis of how elements of the domestic POS may shape NGO participation in GGIs. We deepened the dataset by gathering more granular annual participation data for two major GGIs: attendance at the UNFCCC Conference of Parties and new memberships in the UN Global Compact (UNGC) on corporate social responsibility.⁵ The data from these two GGIs are particularly helpful as they include the largest numbers of NGO participants, are unrestricted and of universal interest with regard to global participation, and are documented on an

² The information varies significantly in structure, however, including whether participation is continuous (and therefore counts are cumulative) or serialized (and counts are annual or meeting-based); whether potential membership is universal or restricted; and whether the GGI issues addressed are broad (inviting global participation) or narrow (making NGOs from countries without that issue unlikely to join).

³ We included branch offices of international NGOs in particular countries (for example, Greenpeace–Russia is coded an NGO from Russia, rather than originating from the global office in Amsterdam). See “Appendix” for full coding scheme.

⁴ Income levels are taken from the World Bank’s income groupings: high, medium, and low GDP per capita. Regime type corresponds to the Polity project’s designation of autocracies (score of –6 to –10), anocracies (–5 to 5) and democracies (6 to 10). Civil Society environment groupings are created from V-Dem (v. 7)’s civil society participation index, with ‘poor’ ranging from 0 to .399, ‘medium’ from .4 to .699, and ‘good’ from .7 to 1.

⁵ This difference in data structure and availability is the major reason why our regression models are limited; we feel that a multilevel model and/or incorporating all 42 GGIs in the previous section is inadvisable. We thank Jennifer Allan for providing access to her UNFCCC NGO participant data for the years 2006–2011.



ongoing annual basis, unlike many other GGIs. We analyze variation in NGO participation by country using data on membership in the UNGC from 2002 to 2012 and the attendance at annual Conference of Parties (COP) meetings of the UNFCCC from 2005 to 2014 (United Nations 2018a, b). From 2002 to 2012, 3108 non-business NGOs became members of the UNGC. UNFCCC COP meetings attracted 5027 NGO delegations from 2005 to 2014.

These data allow us to conduct an exploratory regression analysis for NGO participation in these two large initiatives to examine which country-level factors—those related to general democratic freedoms, material resource access, and civil society operating environment—appear to influence the number of NGOs participating in each GGI per country, per year.


Mapping NGO participation in GGIs: Does influence potential matter?

The 42 initiatives that provided a detailed breakdown of NGO participation in registries or membership databases yielded a combined total of 7528 current or cumulative NGO participants as of mid-2017, depending on the GGI's institutional structure. These GGIs offer a range of NGO roles. First, we consider whether a GGI offers access or the possibility for NGO inclusion. For each GGI in our sample, we ask whether there is an institutional commitment to the role of civil society through allowing NGO access. Second, to assess NGO roles in GGIs and potential influence on GGI negotiation and implementation, we evaluated formal mechanisms for NGO involvement ranging from roles of offering feedback on rules and standards, to attending annual meetings, offering technical expertise, or monitoring other actors' conformity to the GGI's rules. Appendix 1 provides an overview of how NGO roles were evaluated to classify the influence potential offered by GGIs, while Appendix 3 provides more detail on the 42 GGIs.

This mapping exercise suggests how the opportunity to participate in more influential roles in GGIs shapes NGO participation—although given that this participation datum covers only a subset of GGIs worldwide and a wide variety of institutional structures enabling participation, we are cautious in venturing generalizations. We have classified the 42 initiatives for which detailed participation data were available based on the influence potential for NGOs within the GGIs, grouping into 'high' (11 GGIs), 'medium' (14 GGIs), and 'low' influence potential (17 GGIs) categories (see detailed list in Appendix 3). As a shorthand, we refer to these categories as 'high influence,' 'medium influence,' and 'low influence,' but must emphasize that these labels refer to the *potential* influence based on the roles offered to NGOs in the GGI, rather than *actual* influence achieved in policy outcomes. Low-influence GGIs typically offer little beyond basic acknowledgment of NGOs as participants or supporters. For instance, on its website the UN Principles for Responsible Investment merely lists NGOs as 'Supporters,' or those who 'would like to publicly express support for the PRI within their constituency, raising awareness within the investment community of responsible investment and the PRI' (Principles for Responsible Investment, n.d.). Meanwhile, high-influence GGIs offer multiple NGO



Graph 1 Total NGO participation in GGIs, classified by NGO influence potential




roles for exercising influence, including forms of institutional, expert and occasionally delegated authority (Avant et al. 2010). The Forest Stewardship Council permits NGOs to participate as voting members in development of FSC standards and monitor implementation (Forest Stewardship Council, n.d.).

The graph below shows the percent of NGO participants in GGIs at each level of potential influence (Graph 1).


Our overall finding, based on the available data, is that NGOs from all countries gravitate toward high-influence GGIs. Although high-influence GGIs form only a minority of GGIs in our dataset (11/42 initiatives), they attract over 60% of worldwide NGO participation in the dataset, as compared to GGIs that offer medium or low levels of potential influence to NGOs. These data suggest NGOs would be more likely to join GGIs that offer more consequential governance roles and therefore greater potential influence, which may not be surprising. However, it is important to remember that frequently GGIs that offer the greatest potential influence for NGO participants also stipulate significant criteria that NGOs must meet in order to join. For instance, for FSC membership, NGOs must demonstrate a significant amount of technical expertise in sustainable forest management in order to qualify. In other words, participation in high-influence GGIs is often costly for NGOs.

NGO participation in GGIs offering different potential influences may vary across domestic factors: NGOs from richer countries, for example, might spread their participation more evenly across GGIs because resources are not as constrained and more opportunities to participate internationally exist in general. Therefore, we break down these data by domestic factors including income, political regime, and domestic civil society openness. The graphs below display, for our subset of 42 GGIs, the number of NGO participants from countries in different income and political regime categories participating in the GGIs within each level of NGO influence potential (Graphs 2, 3, 4).






Graph 2 Numbers and proportions of NGOs participating in GGIs, classified by NGO influence potential and country income category (Income category data taken from the World Bank’s classification of countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high income based on GDP per capita (World Bank 2018a). To simplify our categories and to make the numbers of countries in each group more comparable, we combined the World Bank ‘lower-middle’ and ‘upper-middle’ categories, leaving us with 56 high-income countries, 96 middle income, and 29 low income)



Graph 3 Numbers and proportions of NGOs participating in GGIs, classified by NGO influence potential and political regime category (Political regime data taken from the Polity dataset regime classifications for the year 2008, a rough midpoint of our participation data timespan representing the best approximation of the typical regime category of countries over the period. We have collapsed their categories of ‘Anocracy’ (closed and open, which we instead label with the more common term ‘hybrid regimes’) and ‘Democracy’ (regular and full), leaving 83 democracies, 50 hybrid regimes, and 23 autocracies in our data (Marshall et al. 2016)





Graph 4 Numbers and proportions of NGOs participating in GGIs, classified by NGO influence potential and domestic civil society environment

While NGOs from all countries are inclined toward initiatives that offer greater potential influence, NGOs from democracies, good domestic civil society environments, and high-income countries seem better able to participate in different types of GGIs than middle- or low-income country NGOs, those from countries with hybrid or autocratic political regimes, and those with less favorable domestic civil society environments. In other words, NGOs from more favorable domestic circumstances participate in larger numbers and in a broader range of GGIs, regardless of influence potential.

Layering the international and domestic political opportunities structures reveals a few important variations on this general trend. For example, NGOs from countries with hybrid regimes are least likely to participate in medium- or low-influence GGIs. Hybrid regime NGOs participate in high-influence GGIs at rates which suggest efforts at a ‘boomerang effect’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Hybrid political systems that are not fully closed—thus allowing for some degree of NGO development but also imposing significant restrictions on advocacy domestically—prompt NGOs to go beyond the domestic arena to make demands. However, these data are not consistent with rates of participation based on the civil society environment, in which highly favorable domestic environments correlate with greater relative participation in high-authority GGIs. A comparison of these two tables suggests that the context in which NGO capacity develops domestically should be considered separately from regime type as a driver of NGO participation. Democratic regimes still may offer challenging conditions for civil society, while some authoritarian regimes may facilitate NGO capacity as part of a broader co-optation strategy.

Meanwhile, NGOs from autocratic regimes have curiously less high-influence gravitation than NGOs from democratic regimes. This is possibly due to the small numbers of autocratic regime participants, exaggerating the effect of a few cases.



But in some cases, it could mean that in these states, only NGOs supported by their autocratic governments are able to access high-influence GGIs. For example, NGOs from China have begun to participate in force in the UNFCCC climate conferences, following the Chinese government's recent prioritization of climate change (Henry and Sundstrom 2017). Overall, NGOs from lower-income and less democratic countries are least likely to expend scarce resources on low-influence initiatives, providing further evidence that domestic POS influences international participation patterns in crucial ways.

Exploring domestic influences on NGO GGI participation

While mapping NGO participation in GGIs by potential influence categories suggests that NGOs generally gravitate toward higher-influence GGIs and that there are interesting variations across income, political regime, and civil society environments of countries, there is still significant variation in the aggregate participation rates of NGOs by country within any particular GGI, suggesting that the variation in participation numbers by country may be explained by domestic factors that enhance or constrain NGO capacity and ability to act effectively at home. As outlined earlier, we have chosen to consider the impacts of democracy [measured through the Worldwide Governance Indicators' Voice and Accountability index (The World Bank 2018a)], economic development [logged GDP/capita, (2018b)], and civil society environment (using the V-Dem 8 (2018) Civil Society Participation index) (Coppedge et al. 2018) as domestic elements of political opportunity structure. In order to examine the effects of these variables while holding other factors constant, we have conducted separate linear regression analyses of NGO participation by country-year for two major GGIs. The two institutions chosen include large numbers of participants and offer detailed participation data: the annual COP conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC).⁶

A closer look at these two GGIs highlights differences in NGO roles that offer high versus medium influence potential. As a convention among states, the UNFCCC (classified as high influence potential) does not offer opportunities for NGOs to participate directly in the formal negotiation process. Nevertheless, the UNFCCC offers a clear role for NGO inclusion. Admitted NGOs have official observer status

⁶ The UNGC model uses UNGC data on the year in which non-business actors—global and local NGOs and labor unions, academic institutions, and foundations—joined the UNGC participatory structure, which until 2013 required no continuing commitment to report activities by non-business participants. It excludes 186 organizations which voluntarily withdrew between 2002 and 2017 (email correspondence with UNGC official), but includes those which were expelled for lack of communications per a 2013 rule change. Thus, the data used here differ from that used in Part 1: it is annualized rather than cumulative and includes organizations that had left by the time the Part 1 information was collected. The UNFCCC data counts the number of NGOs per country sending delegates to the annual Conference of Parties (COP), as reported in the annual COP list of delegates. These data match exactly the data structure in Part 1, but the collection years for Part 2 do not include 2017.



and, as such, can attend most meetings, submit statements, and host side events. NGOs have played a significant role promoting policy options to influence the content of the agreement (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004; Andonova et al. 2009; Fisher 2010), and some NGOs have participated on state delegations at COP meetings, providing them with expertise and increasing their technical capacity. In contrast, roles for NGOs in the UN Global Compact (classified as medium influence potential) are more limited to monitoring private actors—the main participants. In the words of its chief architect, John Ruggie, the UNGC is ‘the archetype of voluntarism’ in its efforts to encourage corporate social responsibility and ‘was designed as a learning forum to promote socially responsible practices in the areas of human rights, workplace standards, the environment, and anticorruption’ (Ruggie 2013, pp, xxix–xxx). Firms participating in the UNGC engage in mandatory reporting, which allows NGO to monitor their behavior informally, holding businesses accountable to the ten principles of the compact. NGOs also may carry out partnerships with businesses to enhance corporate social responsibility and participate in UNGC local networks.

In our regression analysis of NGO participation for these two GGIs, we control for logged population size cross-nationally and increasing levels of participation generally over time and include a dummy variable for the USA, a major outlier in the number of NGOs participating in GGIs. We also incorporate issue-specific control variables, including state regulatory quality and government efficiency for the UNGC, since the UNGC is aimed at tackling corporate social responsibility and corrupt practices, and per GDP CO₂ emissions and fossil fuel consumption rates for the UNFCCC (European Union Joint Research Hub 2016; The World Bank 2018a, b), with the expectation that a country’s contribution to global climate change is likely to affect the frequency with which NGOs from that country participate in UNFCCC conferences.⁷ The regression is performed with robust standard errors upon country-year panel data (Table 1).

Statistical analysis confirms and extends our hypotheses in several ways. For the domestic POS, we find that the influence of the level of democracy on NGO participation in GGIs is significant and positive across both initiatives, indicating that the greater citizens’ ability to exercise voice and hold their governments accountable inside a country, the more the country’s NGOs are likely to participate in GGIs. For every point increase in the WGI Voice and Accountability score (which ranges from –2.5 to 2.5), approximately 1 or 2.4 more NGOs per country can be expected to participate in the UNGC and UNFCCC, respectively [while mean total participation per country is 1.6 and 2.5 NGOs, respectively (Appendix 4)]. Democracy at home encourages NGOs’ GGI participation, likely by offering the freedom of movement and expression necessary to engage in transnational advocacy activities.

⁷ The model for the UNFCCC also adds two variables related to the GGI itself, rather than the issue addressed: the year 2009 as an outlier in delegate numbers and ‘UNFCCC host’ to signify a greater number of NGOs from the state hosting the COP that year. See “Appendix 3” for full details of all variables used.



Table 1 Regression results for NGO participation by country in the UNGC and UNFCCC

Variable type		UNGC (2002–2012)		UNFCCC (2005–2014)	
		Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P
Explanatory	WGI Voice and Accountability	1.0394 (.423)	.014	2.4451 (.628)	0
Explanatory	V-Dem CS Particip. (aggregate)	−2.104 (1.246)	.061	−2.899 (1.257)	.021
Explanatory	Log GDP per capita	1.671 (.6405)	.009	2.974 (.9929)	.003
Control (general)	Year	.0112 (.0376)	.003	.2034 (.0953)	.033
Control (general)	Log Population	1.026 (.2222)	0	1.7941 (.3812)	0
Control (general)	USA	32.149 (1.568)	0	96.1801 (2.67)	0
Control (institution)	Year 2009			2.552 (.788)	.001
Control (institution)	FCCC Host			12.9087 (5.189)	.013
Control (institution)	Per GDP CO2			.0056 (.0013)	0
Control (institution)	Fossil Fuel Consumption			−0.042 (.0106)	.02
Control (institution)	WGI Government Efficiency	−1.048 (.487)	.032		
Control (institution)	WGI Regulatory Quality	.5405 (.3955)	.175		
	Constant	−244.209 (74.38)	.001		
	N			1325	
	Est. R2			.6494	

However, the aggregate V-Dem measure of the quality of domestic civil society participatory environment—including ease of NGO consultation, gender equality in civil society, levels of citizen participation in civil society organizations, and citizens' and NGOs' ability to affect political candidate selection—is negatively correlated with NGO participation in these GGIs, albeit at only a weak level of significance in one model. At least for these two large initiatives with medium and high influence potential for NGOs, and focusing narrowly on cross-national variation of participation within them, a more favorable opportunity structure at home—including more consultation with the state and greater opportunities for participation domestically—for NGOs may lead to lower engagement in GGIs. This tentative finding supports a central tenet of the boomerang model in which NGOs facing a constrained POS for achieving their advocacy goals domestically are more likely to



seek global venues to achieve their goals. However, the size of the effect is smaller than that of the Voice and Accountability measure of democracy: a one-point increase in the CS participation score, which is the whole range of the measure, correlates with only 2.1 or 2.9 fewer NGOs, respectively.⁸

Second, we explore how resource availability may influence NGO participation in GGIs. Per capita income is positively correlated with participation in both institutions, at 1.7 and nearly 3 more NGOs per 1% increase in logged GDP per capita. We urge caution in the interpretation of our resource access variables: while GDP per capita offers a broad measure of wealth, it is likely too crude an indicator to convey resource availability for NGOs in a given domestic context, given inequality of resource distribution (Osberg and Sharpe 2002; Stiglitz et al. 2017). In addition, other types of hard-to-measure resources may be at play, including useful contacts with relevant state officials, domestic laws that support charitable giving, and robust, cooperative networks among NGOs at home.⁹

We suspect that some of the differences in NGO participation above or below expectations in particular GGIs, and the differences in the dataset as a whole, may be predicated upon particular features of the state–society relationship which drive participation in different types of GGIs, or issue-specific concerns of that state’s government, population, or private economic actors. Like Hanegraaff et al. (Hanegraaff et al. 2015), we propose that different types of interest intermediation, which may not be captured in simpler measures of civil society strength or government openness, may shift the incentive structure for NGOs to go global. This is an important issue for future research.

Conclusion and directions for future research

NGO participation is an essential precursor to their influence inside GGIs. GGI design appears to play a significant role in encouraging or discouraging participation by NGOs and thus influences whose interests are represented at the global level. We have taken initial steps in this paper to map global POS by categorizing NGO access and governance roles across a wide range of GGIs. We find that GGIs that offer higher potential influence for NGOs, represented by a more consequential set of roles within GGIs, do indeed attract greater participation in general. In future analysis, it would be fruitful to gather more specific systematized data on the quality and depth of NGO participation, to go beyond the basic questions of whether NGOs are drawn to certain levels and categories of roles and instead measure how institutionalized and substantive their roles are—that is, where they *actually* possess influence

⁸ We are aware of potential issues with multicollinearity among our independent variables, particularly those for domestic POS. For a full account of correlations and stepwise regressions to investigate further, see “Appendix 5”.

⁹ See “Appendix 6” for analyses of different variables representing other potential sources of or impediments to NGO participation in GGIs.



over decisions, as opposed to either mere pro forma input exercises or GGIs' ad hoc engagement of sympathetic NGOs.

At the same time, characteristics of the domestic POS shape NGOs' ability to participate in GGIs. We have demonstrated some tendencies of NGOs from sets of countries grouped by income level and regime type to participate in higher or lower numbers in GGIs offering them different levels of potential influence. Further, through a more detailed analysis of NGO participation by country of origin in the UNFCCC and UNGC, we have further demonstrated the importance of several country-level economic and political factors in shaping domestic NGO capacity to participate in GGIs. Identifying available indicators such as level of democracy, economic development, and civil society participatory environment as significant, albeit blunt, predictors of participation in two major GGIs is a first step in investigating the effects of domestic political opportunity environment. However, this statistical analysis suggests that other domestic factors closely related to NGO consultation and resource availability likely play a role as well—factors which may or may not be captured by existing quantitative measures and which may vary significantly even across states of the same regime type or wealth. In order to further the interaction of approaches in IR and comparative politics to examine interest group participation in GGIs, we propose that scholars of GGIs make more nuanced use of comparative work that goes beyond regime type to look at NGO regulation, civil society strength, and state–society relations. A full exploration of these questions requires a variety of methodological approaches, including qualitative case studies, focused comparisons, and large-N statistical analyses.

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Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Appendix 1: Overview of NGO potential influence rankings and measures

Initiatives were scored on the potential influence NGOs could have in a global governance institution through roles related to decision-making or accountability mechanisms, with 'points' assigned to each role as follows, and categorization of GGIs as 'high' potential influence if the roles totaled 3.5 points or higher; 'medium' if totaling 2.5–3 points; and 'low' if totaling 0.5–2.0 points.



Basic access

Being a signatory of an agreement or listed as a member is an indication that an NGO is considered to hold similar standing in the GGI as other types of members (such as corporations or even government actors), so we assigned a full point for each of these roles. In contrast, being an ‘observer’ means that NGOs are not considered members with equal rights of full parties; for instance, they cannot vote on decisions made. Thus, we assigned ‘observer’ roles for NGOs only ½ point.

- Signatory of convention/agreement for GGI (1 point)
- Appears on registry of ‘members’ (1 point)
- Appears on registry of ‘observers’ (1/2 point).

Consultation or monitoring roles

Having gained access to a GGI, NGOs may play a variety of governance roles that contribute to their potential influence. The ability to attend regular meetings, no matter what the membership status, is an important substantive role that offers potential influence for NGOs, so we assigned this role a full point. NGOs often place a role in promoting accountability, either through formal monitoring within the GGI (one point) or through more informal naming and shaming (1/2 point). NGOs may also carry out ongoing projects or hold one-time events sanctioned by the GGI (one point each). Finally, NGO shapes rules and standards though offering comment and feedback, providing technical expertise, or facilitating stakeholder engagement (one point each).

- Attends regular meetings (1 point)
- Monitors formally compliance or auditing compliance (1 point)
- Promotes accountability informally (1/2 point)
- Carries out projects under auspices of GGI (1 point)
- Hosts a affiliated event (1 point)
- Provides comment or feedback on rules and standards (1 point)
- Provides technical expertise (1 point)
- Facilitates in stakeholder engagement (1 point).

Indicator	Measures	Typical website sections	Evaluation of evidence
Basic access	Institutional commitment to NGOs role in advancing the initiative	Homepage About Us Vision/mission/goals Background/history Partners/Stakeholders	Evidence evaluated nominally as follows: Yes No



Indicator	Measures	Typical website sections	Evaluation of evidence
Roles played by NGOs	Mechanisms for NGO participation	How we work Structure Governance Participating organizations Background/history How we work Implementation Action Projects/Activities Campaigns Partners Participating organizations Members Supporting Organizations	Categories of roles identified by GGI: Signatory of convention/agreement Membership privileges Observer/supporter privileges Attendance at annual meeting Host a side event Comment on rules/standards Offer technical expertise Formal monitoring/auditing Informal monitoring related to GGI transparency initiatives. Projects executed under auspices of GGI Consult as stakeholder Receive funding

Appendix 2: Dataset list of 126 global governance initiatives

1. Caux Round Table Principles for Business
2. Clarkson Principles for Stakeholder Management
3. An Interfaith Declaration: Code of Ethics on International Business for Christians, Muslims and Jews
4. Global Sullivan Principles for Social Responsibility
5. GoodCorporation Standard
6. IFC Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability
7. ISO-26000 Guidance on Corporate Social Responsibility
8. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
9. Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility
10. United Nations Global Compact
11. Global Reporting Initiative
12. Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste
13. CERES Roadmap for Sustainability
14. ISO 14000 Environmental Management
15. UNFCCC
16. Stockholm Convention
17. International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement
18. International Coral Reef Initiative
19. World Commission on Dams



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20. Carbon Disclosure Project
 21. IISD Bellagio Principles
 22. Earth Charter
 23. ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development
 24. Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development
 25. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
 26. Millennium Development Goals
 27. ETI Base Code
 28. Fair Labour Association Workplace Code of Conduct
 29. ILO Core Labour Declarations
 30. ILO Declaration on MNEs and Social Policy
 31. Social Accountability International
 32. Workers' Rights Consortium
 33. Verite Research, Consulting, Assessment and Training
 34. Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI)
 35. FairWear Foundation Labour Standards
 36. UN CEDAW and Beijing Declaration Conferences
 37. Calvert Women's Principles
 38. UN Global Compact Women's Empowerment Principles
 39. International Corporate Governance Network Principles
 40. OECD Principles for Corporate Governance
 41. Principles for CG in the Commonwealth
 42. International Accounting Standards Board
 43. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
 44. Basel Statement on Prevention of Money Laundering
 45. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
 46. Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles
 47. APEC Course of Action on Corruption and Transparency
 48. Partnering Against Corruption Initiative
 49. IMF Code, Manual and Guide on Fiscal and Resource Revenue Transparency
 50. ICC Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery
 51. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
 52. OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
 53. Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery
 54. UN Convention Against Corruption
 55. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes
 56. UN Code of Conduct for Public Officials
 57. Amnesty International Human Rights Principles for Companies
 58. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
 59. UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
 60. ICC Marketing Codes
 61. Apparel Industry Partnership Workplace Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring
 62. Clean Clothes Campaign
 63. Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production Principles
 64. Responsible Care
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65. EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
 66. US Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct
 67. Arms Trade Treaty
 68. International Stability Operations Association Code of Conduct
 69. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC)
 70. Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct
 71. Global e-Sustainability Initiative
 72. Council for Responsible Jewelry Practices Code of Conduct
 73. Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative
 74. International Council on Mining and Metals Sustainable Development Principles
 75. International Gas Union Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development
 76. Kimberly Process
 77. Collevocchio Declaration on Financial Institutions
 78. Equator Principles
 79. Statement of Environmental Commitment by the Insurance Industry
 80. UN Principles for Responsible Investment
 81. UNEP FI Statement on the Environment and Sustainable Development
 82. Financial Stability Board
 83. Group of 20
 84. International Association of Insurance Supervisors
 85. International Competition Network
 86. Joint Forum
 87. World Bank Inspection Panel
 88. FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
 89. Marine Stewardship Council
 90. WHO/UNICEF International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
 91. WHO Strategy on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs)
 92. The Framework for Responsible Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverage Marketing Communications
 93. 4C (Common Code for the Coffee Community) Association Code of Conduct for the Coffee Sector
 94. International Cocoa Initiative
 95. Codex Alimentarius
 96. Forest Stewardship Council
 97. WHO Strategy on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs)
 98. The Framework for Responsible Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverage Marketing Communications
 99. 4C (Common Code for the Coffee Community) Association Code of Conduct for the Coffee Sector
 100. The Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC)
 101. UN Forest Principles
 102. International Road Transport Union Charter for Sustainable Development
 103. International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Associations Code of Practice
 104. WHO Ethical criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion
 105. International Conference on the Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceutical Products
 106. Good Weave International (formerly Rugmark)
 107. FIFA Code of Labour Practice for the Production of FIFA trademark footballs
 108. World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry Model Code of Conduct
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- 109. International Council of Toy Industries Code of Conduct
 - 110. World Steel Industry Sustainable Development Vision and Goals
 - 111. Charter for Environmental Action in the Hotel Industry
 - 112. Global Code of Ethics in Tourism
 - 113. World Charter for Sustainable Tourism
 - 114. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
 - 115. UN Aids
 - 116. International Partnership for Microbicides
 - 117. International Aids Society
 - 118. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI)
 - 119. Global Polio Eradication Initiative
 - 120. Global Partnership for a Malaria-Free World (Roll Back Malaria)
 - 121. Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
 - 122. Stop TB Partnership
 - 123. Drugs For Neglected Diseases
 - 124. Framework Convention Alliance
 - 125. International Health Partnership and IHP+
 - 126. UNITAID
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Appendix 3: Global governance institutions with available NGO participation data

Initiative	Type	Themes addressed	Target sector	NGO influence potential	Total NGOs
1. Apparel Industry Partnership Workplace Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring	Voluntary Regulations	Labour Rights	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Low	8
2. Calvert Women's Principles	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Gender	Finance and Investment	Low	1
3. Caux Round Table Principles for Business	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Sustainable Development, Environment, Human Rights	Cross-cutting	Low	13
4. Clean Clothes Campaign	Voluntary Regulations	Labour Rights	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Medium	106
5. Codex Alimentarius	Voluntary Regulations	Public Health, Commerce	Public Sector	Medium	147



Initiative	Type	Themes addressed	Target sector	NGO influence potential	Total NGOs
6. Collevocchio Declaration on Financial Institutions	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Sustainable Development	Finance and Investment	Low	99
7. Drugs For Neglected Diseases	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Public Health	Health and Pharmaceuticals	Medium	12
8. Earth Charter	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Sustainable Development, Environment, Human Rights	Cross-cutting	Medium	84
9. Ethical Trading Initiative	Voluntary Regulations	Labour Rights	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Medium	21
10. Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative	Voluntary Regulations	Sustainable Development, Environment, Human Rights	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Low	9
11. Forest Stewardship Council	Voluntary Regulations	Environment	Manufacturing, resources, retail	High	219
12. Framework Convention Alliance	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Public Health, Sustainable Development	Public Sector	High	277
13. Global Coffee Platform	Voluntary Regulations	Sustainable Development, Environment, Labour Rights	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Medium	10
14. Global e-Sustainability Initiative	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Sustainable Development	ICT	Low	10
15. Global Polio Eradication Initiative	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Public Health	Cross-cutting	Low	2
16. Global Reporting Initiative	Voluntary Regulations	Sustainable Development, Environment, Labour Rights	Cross-cutting	Low	64
17. GoodCorporation Standard	Voluntary Regulations	Labour Rights, Environment	Cross-cutting	Low	1
18. IISD Bellagio Principles	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Sustainable Development	Cross-cutting	Low	8
19. International Cocoa Initiative	Voluntary Regulations	Labour Rights	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Medium	7



Initiative	Type	Themes addressed	Target sector	NGO influence potential	Total NGOs
20. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC)	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Security	Defence and Military	Medium	22
21. International Coral Reef Initiative	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Environment	Public Sector	High	22
22. International Health Partnership and IHP+	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Public Health, Sustainable Development	Cross-cutting	High	14
23. International Partnership for Microbicides	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Public Health	Health and Pharmaceuticals	Medium	13
24. Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development	Transgovernmental Networks	Sustainable Development, Environment	Cross-cutting	Low	31
25. Kimberly Process	Voluntary Regulations	Sustainable Development, Human Rights, Environment	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Medium	12
26. Marine Stewardship Council	Voluntary Regulations	Environment, Sustainable Development	Manufacturing, resources, retail	High	15
27. Millennium Development Goals	Transgovernmental Networks	Gender, Sustainable Development, Public Health	Cross-cutting	High	383
28. OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption	Transgovernmental Networks	Economic regulation, Commerce	Public Sector	High	456
29. Social Accountability International	Voluntary Regulations	Labour Rights, Human Rights	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Low	26
30. Stockholm Convention	Transgovernmental Networks	Environment	Public Sector	High	88
31. Stop TB Partnership	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Public Health	Health and Pharmaceuticals	High	1316
32. Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Commerce	Cross-cutting	Medium	115



Initiative	Type	Themes addressed	Target sector	NGO influence potential	Total NGOs
33. UN Aids	Transgovernmental Networks	Public Health	Cross-cutting	Medium	47
34. UN Convention Against Corruption	Transgovernmental Networks	Commerce	Public Sector	Low	41
35. UN FCCC	Transgovernmental Networks	Environment	Public Sector	High	1769
36. UN Forest Principles	Transgovernmental Networks	Environment, Sustainable Development	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Low	50
37. UN Global Compact Women's Empowerment Principles	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Gender	Cross-cutting	Medium	9
38. UN Principles for Responsible Investment	Voluntary Regulations	Environment, Human Rights, Labour Rights	Finance and Investment	Low	32
39. United Nations Global Compact	Voluntary Regulations	Sustainable Development, Environment, Human Rights	Cross-cutting	Medium	1842
40. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights	Voluntary Regulations	Human Rights, Security	Manufacturing, resources, retail	Medium	13
41. WHO Strategy on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs)	Transgovernmental Networks	Public Health	Public Sector	Low	113
42. Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Economic regulation, Commerce	Finance and Investment	Low	1

Appendix 4: Variables included in descriptive statistics and regression models

See Table 2.



Table 2 Bold rows are those used in models which appear only in the appendix

Variable	Definition	Range/mean/median in our observations	Source
Dependent Variable	# of CSOs per country participating in the UNFCCC or joining the UNGC in any given year. While the UNFCCC does not code its non-governmental delegations by organization type, the UNGC does. Included in our basic model are global and local NGOs, academia, foundations, and global and local labour unions. Alternative models of the UNGC regression which restrict the dataset to NGOs only and include business associations can be found below	UNGC: 0–48 (Spain 2012) UNFCCC: 0–179 (USA 2009) Mean UNGC: 1.596865 Median UNGC: 0 Mean UNFCCC: 2.492315 Median UNFCCC: 0	UNGC and UNFCCC
WGI Voice and Accountability	Aggregate score of 'perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media'	–2.5 (worst possible) to 2.5 (best possible)	World Bank, Governance Indicators
WGI Rule of Law	Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence	–2.5 (worst possible) to 2.5 (best possible) Mean: –.1842 Median: –.4116	World Bank, Governance Indicators



Table 2 (continued)

Variable	Definition	Range/mean/median in our observations	Source
WGI Government Efficiency	Aggregate score of 'perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies'	-2.5 (worst possible) to 2.5 (best possible) Mean: -.117984 Median: -.3166342	World Bank, Governance Indicators
WGI Regulatory Quality	Aggregate score of 'perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development'	-2.5 (worst possible) to 2.5 (best possible) Mean: -.1217828 Median: -.2641241	World Bank, Governance Indicators
V-Dem Civil Society Participation index	Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?	0 (none) to 1 (perfect). Mean: .6864476 Median: .7408906	V-Dem 8.0
V-Dem Civil Society Repression	Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?	-3.5 (worst) to 3.5 (best) Mean: 1.037 Median: 1.258	V-Dem 8.0
PolityIV Score	What is the country's aggregate level of democracy?	Range: -10 (complete authoritarian system) to 10 (full democracy) 0 (no) or 1 (yes)	PolityIV Project Dupuy et al. (2016)
NGO law suppressing foreign financing?	Is there a particular law regulating or suppressing the foreign financing of NGOs? This might skew the results based purely on ODA		

Table 2 (continued)

Variable	Definition	Range/mean/median in our observations	Source
Freedom House Civil Liberties	‘The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4)’	1 (free) to 7 (not free)	Freedom House 2018
Year	Year	Whole database: 2000–2016 2002–2012 (UNGC tested) or 2005–2015 (UNFCCC tested)	
Log Population	Logged Country population	Continuous variable Min Pop: 9420 (Tuvalu 2000) Max Pop: 1.38e+09 (China 2016) Mean Pop : 3.40e+07 Median Pop : 6766103	World Bank, Development Indicators
Log GDP per capita	Logged Country GDP per capita (original in current US\$)	Continuous variable Min GDPpc: 80.45724 (Burundi 2003) Max GDPpc: 187649.8 (Monaco 2014) Mean GDPpc: 12872.93 Median GDPpc: 3861.916	World Bank, Development Indicators
Civil Society-Specific Aid	ODA, OOF flows, Equity Investments, and Export Credits, 1946–2013 (where available), in US\$ at the time	Continuous variable Min: –1102273 (Kiribati 2009) Max: 1.24e09 (Brazil 2001) Mean: 2.39e07 Median: 2679159	AidData



Table 2 (continued)

Variable	Definition	Range/mean/median in our observations	Source
Net ODA (current US\$)	Net Overseas Development Aid received (loan disbursements and grants minus repayments of loan principal), collected by the OECD. We assume that Aid is already somewhat scaled to population size by donors, as well as being a finitely distributed object (unlike GDP per capita, which assumes resource change across broad sectors of society), thus allowing us to use the pure number rather than one calculated per capita	Continuous variable Min: -947 million (Thailand 2003) Max: 2.21 billion US\$ (Iraq 2005) Mean: 347 million US\$ Median: 89.9 million US\$	World Bank, Development Indicators
Net ODA per capita	Net Overseas Development Aid received (loan disbursements and grants minus repayments of loan principal), collected by the OECD, as measured against World Bank population estimates	Continuous variable Min: -111.56 Max: 4513.27 Mean: 90.39 Median: 19.90	World Bank, Development Indicators
Country Dummies	What country is it?	0 (no) or 1 (yes)	
Year 2009	Is it 2009? (the Copenhagen Accords final negotiations meant a bump in delegates, making this year an outlier in the chronological progression)	0 (no) or 1 (yes)	
FCCC Host	Is the country a current host of the UNFCCC COP? The annual meeting travels, suggesting more NGOs from the host state	0 (no) or 1 (yes)	UNFCCC



Table 2 (continued)

Variable	Definition	Range/mean/median in our observations	Source
Per GDP CO2	CO2 emission totals (in kilotons) of fossil fuel use and industrial processes per IMF/WEO data of GDP (expressed in 1000 US dollar adjusted to the Purchasing Power Parity of 2011)	Continuous variable Min: .028133 (Cape Verde 2008) Max: 662.357 (North Korea 2006) Mean: 3.148409 Median: .2256545	Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)
Fossil Fuel Consumption	% of a country's total energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels	0-100 Mean: 64.5516 Median: 74.30399	World Bank, Development Indicators



Appendix 5: Correlations between independent variables

Logged GDP per capita and WB Voice and Accountability: 0.6450
Logged GDP per capita and logged population: -0.2560
Logged GDP per capita and World Bank ODA (all countries): -0.3370
WB Voice and Accountability and World Bank ODA (all countries): -0.2613
V-Dem CS Participatory and V-Dem CS Repression: 0.8372
WB Voice and Accountability and V-Dem CS Participation: 0.7950
WB Voice and Accountability and V-Dem CS Repression: .8538

As is shown above, some of our independent variables are highly correlated, as we would expect them to be. Namely, our domestic opportunity structures variables tend to covary: they reflect the same general tendencies. Voice and Accountability and logged GDP per capita are 64% correlated; however, we feel there is no problem testing them within the same model, as it is quite common. We expect some multicollinearity here, as the underlying factors which shape the VaA score probably also influence the relative freedom of the economy and thus the country's ability to grow rich, but not a perfect set of causal processes leading from one to the other. Logged GDP per capita and logged population are not highly correlated, and neither are Voice and Accountability and Official Development Aid, posing no problem for our models. Our resource variables (logged GDP per capita and World Bank ODA) are also not highly correlated. Therefore, the only potential issue is with the governance variables.

In order to see if these correlations among our governance variables influence the model, we use comparative and stepwise analyses. Given that only the governance variables are correlated, the stepwise comparison leaves the resources variables in the model.



Stepwise Model Building: UNFCCC and Governance. Model 2a is used in the main body of the article.

	UNFCCC (no govern- ance)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 1a)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 1b)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 2a)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 2b)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 3)	
	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P
WGI Voice and Accountability			1.809 (.5399)	.001			2.4315 (.625)	.000	1.8508 (.7026)	.008	2.2363 (.6641)	.001
V-Dem CS Particip. (aggregate)					2.4564 (1.2778)	.055	-2.8153 (1.222)	.021			-3.5307 (1.981)	.075
V-Dem CS repression												
Log GDP per capita	4.8197 (1.1371)	.000	3.1046 (.9722)	.001	4.4853 (1.053)	.000	2.9046 (.9791)	.003	3.0938 (.9427)	.001	2.9609 (.9535)	.002
World Bank Net ODA (mil- lions)	-9.4e-5 (.00002)	.637	-0.001 (.0002)	.612	-0.0011 (.0002)	.583	-0.001 (.0002)	.657	-0.011 (.0002)	.001	-0.009 (.0002)	.655
Year	0.1392 (.0851)	.102	.1936 (.0939)	.039	.1461 (.0873)	.094	.2057 (.0961)	.032	.1937 (.0932)	.038	0.2074 (.098)	.034
Log Population	1.5955 (.3508)	.000	1.7685 (.3867)	.000	1.7289 (.3827)	.000	1.8084 (.3875)	.000	1.7686 (.3866)	.000	1.8207 (.3865)	.000
USA	97.271 (2.511)	.000	95.9514 (2.69)	.000	96.3583 (2.7113)	.000	96.1376 (2.6838)	.000	95.9536 (2.682)	.000	96.1449 (2.6973)	.000
Year 2009	2.4519 (0.7562)	.001			2.4974 (.7694)	.001	2.5497 (.7881)	.001	2.5562 (.7863)	.001	2.5433 (.7844)	.001
FCCC Host	13.05597 (5.2037)	.012	12.9312 (5.1973)	.013	13.0371 (5.2064)	.012	12.9027 (5.1943)	.013	12.9318 (5.2018)	.013	12.8887 (5.1947)	.013
Per GDP CO2	.0038 (.0009)	.000	.006 (.0013)	.000	.0048 (.0012)	.000	.0055 (.0013)	.000	.00598 (.0014)	.000	0.0058 (.0014)	.000





	UNFCCC (no govern- ance)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 1a)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 1b)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 2a)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 2b)		UNFCCC (Govern- ance 3)	
	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P
Fossil Fuel Con- sumption	-.0508 (.0113)	.000	-.0396 (.0103)	.000	-.0438 (.0105)	.000	-.0422 (.0105)	.000	-.0396 (.0103)	.000	-0.0425 (.0105)	.000
Constant	-317.652 (168.86)	.06	-424.026 (186.89)	.023	-334.642 (173.61)	.054	-445.994 (190.86)	.019	-424.140 (185.90)	.023	-449.511 (194.728)	.021
N	1407		1325		1356		1325		1324		1325	
Est. R2	.6354		.6498		.6424		.6497		.6499		.6484	

Stepwise Model Building: UNGC and Governance. Model 2a is used in the main body of the article

	UNGCC (no govern- ance)		UNGCC (Govern- ance 1a)		UNGCC (Govern- ance 1b)		UNGCC (Governance 2a)		UNGCC (Governance 2b)		UNGCC (Governance 3)	
	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P
WGI Voice and Account- ability	.6328 (.3254)	.052					1.0415 (.4224)	.014	.60075 (.4395)	.172	.8637 (.4464)	.053
V-Dem CS Particip. (aggregate)												
V-Dem CS repression												
Log GDP per capita	1.9692 (.6958)	.005	1.8384 (.6445)	.004	1.9496 (.6983)	.005	1.6961 (.6409)	.008	1.8422 (.6436)	.004	1.6863 (.6419)	.009

	UNGC (no govern- ance)		UNGCC (Govern- ance 1a)		UNGCC (Governance 1b)		UNGC (Governance 2a)		UNGC (Governance 2b)		UNGC (Governance 3)	
	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P
World Bank Net ODA (millions)	.0001 (.0002)	.604	.00009 (.0002)	.630	.00011 (.0002)	.591	.00011 (.0002)	.575	.00009 (.0002)	.634	.00011 (.0002)	.579
Year	.0936 (.0358)	.009	.0987 (.0348)	.005	.0955 (.0371)	.010	.1091 (.0367)	.003	.09856 (.0346)	.004	.11088 (.0376)	.003
Log Population	.9395 (.2116)	.000	.9879 (.2166)	.000	.9383 (.2138)	.000	1.0048 (.2197)	.000	.9876 (.2167)	.000	1.0090 (.2205)	.000
USA	32.3116 (1.5234)	.000	32.053 (1.5649)	.000	32.399 (1.5625)	.000	32.2324 (1.5689)	.000	32.023 (1.5640)	.000	32.2598 (1.5731)	.000
WGI Govern- ment Efficac- ity	-.7778 (.4596)	.091	-.9523 (.4906)	.052	-.7628 (.4602)	.097	-1.0126 (.492)	.040	-.9451 (.4821)	.050	-.9625 (.4818)	.046
WGI Regula- tory Quality	.6399 (.3809)	.093	.4592 (.3992)	.250	.6851 (.3924)	.081	.5286 (.3998)	.186	.45597 (.3912)	.244	.5161 (.3988)	.196
Constant	-208.512 (70.75)	.003	-219.004 (68.89)	.001	-211.8238 (72.981)	.001	-238.1072 (72.49)	.001	-218.7476 (68.597)	.001	-241.5179 (74.125)	.001
N	2142		2142		2142		2142		2142		2142	
Est. R2	.3955		.4065		.3920		.4020		.4064		.4002	



Analysis: As is shown above, even though the two V-Dem variables covary at a rate of .8372, they have very different coefficients in the overall models (UNFCCC and UNGC). While the CS Participatory Environment model (Governance 2a) changes the coefficient of the World Bank Voice and Accountability variable and introduces a negative effect—higher CS participation at home correlates to lower participation abroad—the CS Repression variable (2b) has almost no effect. Not only is it nearly random, but it does little to change either the other coefficients or the estimated R2. However, we test it in a combined model (Governance 3) because a) repression is considered, separately from the participatory environment, to be a potentially theoretically significant driver of NGO activity and b) as with ODA, we are responding to earlier reviewer comments. Essentially, the inclusion of the CS repression variable tests more theory while sacrificing the p value on the CS participatory environment variable due to multicollinearity.

The same trends are represented in the UNGC model as in the UNFCCC model, although the CS participation variable remains significant only at the $p < .1$ level in the Governance 2a model. In this case, CS participation is NOT significant by itself, further suggesting that the Voice and Accountability and CS Participation variables are picking up separate trends. The better model (2a) appears to correct for omitted variable bias from 1b. Contrary to reviewer concerns, the UNGC model is robust even without model 2b (CS repress without CS participation). However, due to multicollinearity concerns with having all three governance variables in one model and the apparent inability of CS repression to provide predictive power, we use ‘Governance 2a’ as our ‘definitive’ model of CS participation in both GGIs

Appendix 6: Selected alternative regression models

See Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

In response to earlier reviewer concerns, we tested a version of the model which includes overseas development aid. The working hypothesis was that overseas aid specifically targeted sectors of the political system which would enable NGOs to participate in global governance at greater rates than GDP per capita might suggest. However, we found no evidence to support this hypothesis using the World Bank’s indicator of net ODA. It is possible that different measures of ODA which are more specific—targeting civil society only instead of other development initiatives—could provide a finer-grained analysis than the World Bank data. Although we tested this with AidData, we do not feel that our data are robust enough to report any findings: the AidData observations end around 2009, limiting the number of cases included, particularly for the UNFCCC (Table 6).

Some might question whether the type of non-governmental organization counted affects our results; it could be that only certain types of civil society organizations (CSOs) follow the logic we set out or have access to particular types of resources. A form of robustness check, therefore, would be to separately test different agglomerations of CSO type across the same institutional data. Since it is nearly impossible to separate out the UNFCCC business associations from other types of nonprofits



Table 3 Comparisons of different measures of democracy

	Plain			Polity2			WGI Voice/Acc.			V-Dem Polyarchy		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P
UNFCCC 2006–2014				0.1072131	0.0418961	0.01	1.803429	0.5409817	0.001	4.489175	1.681631	0.008
Polity2												
WGI Voice/Accountability												
V-Dem Polyarchy												
Log GDP pc year	4.882166	1.147264	0	4.715907	1.12478	0	3.192571	0.9879769	0.001	3.960363	1.06903	0
Log Population Year 2009	1.58261	0.3469298	0	1.84224	0.4132189	0	1.750689	0.3798936	0	1.7104	0.3782158	0
FCCC Host US	2.454503	0.7565176	0.001	2.553167	0.7878464	0.001	2.558554	0.7883391	0.001	2.486674	0.7670511	0.001
Per GDP CO2 Fossil fuel consumption	97.30601	2.501685	0	96.00217	2.753013	0	95.99324	2.67755	0	96.13303	2.690544	0
Constant	0.0038982	0.0009125	0	0.0051551	0.0011463	0	0.0061683	0.0013401	0	0.0050171	0.0011259	0
N	-0.0508428	0.0113035	0	-0.0438607	0.0113771	0	-0.0397578	0.0103769	0	-0.042863	0.010659	0
Est. R2	-313.3481	167.2372	0.061	-337.2424	177.0546	0.057	-417.9316	184.8489	0.024	-360.1439	178.2722	0.043
	4.882166	1.147264	0	4.715907	1.12478	0	3.192571	0.9879769	0.001	3.960363	1.06903	0
	0.1370283	0.0842837	0.104	0.1465989	0.0890821	0.1	0.1905636	0.0929325	0.04	0.1594543	0.0896576	0.075
	1407			1310			1325			1356		
	.635			.644			.6494			.6442		



Table 4 WGI Rule of Law

	Plain			WGI Basic			WGI expanded		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P
UNGC 2002–2015									
WGI Voice/Accountability	0.6465436	0.3250691	0.047				0.6207943	0.2946692	0.035
WGI Rule of Law				0.3781376	0.6709266	0.573	0.1500043	0.6517359	0.818
Log GDP pc	1.811184	0.6405763	0.005	1.890727	0.6488169	0.004	1.796105	0.6148303	0.003
Log Population	1.007059	0.2187944	0	0.974714	0.2214432	0	1.011079	0.2234342	0
year	0.1016153	0.0354323	0.004	0.0975826	0.0356575	0.006	0.1017788	0.0351436	0.004
US	-0.985152	0.483585	0.042	-0.9794817	0.6305126	0.12	-1.046067	0.6376563	0.101
WGI Gov Eff.	0.4719297	0.3966165	0.234	0.5250838	0.4237398	0.215	0.4268268	0.4391317	0.331
WGI Reg. Qual.	-225.0176	70.31868	0.001	-216.7157	70.67699	0.002	-225.3457	69.75825	0.001
Constant	1.811184	0.6405763	0.005	0.3781376	0.6709266	0.573	0.6207943	0.2946692	0.035
N	2142			2142			2142		
Est. R2	.4065			.396			.4064		



Table 5 Different V-Dem CS measures

UNGC 2002–2015	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P
	V-Dem CS Participation	-0.4343249	0.8353814	0.603				-2.009966	1.443236
V-Dem CS Repression				0.1982922	0.1776362	0.264	0.3998565	0.2694229	0.138
Log GDP pc	1.924293	0.6962544	0.006	0.0974214	0.0363479	0.007	0.1053049	0.0392138	0.007
Log Population	0.9593476	0.2167215	0	32.11099	1.542468	0	32.31631	1.561737	0
Year	0.0983527	0.0378085	0.009	-0.8190259	0.4575074	0.073	-0.7859714	0.4529114	0.083
US	0.6967871	0.3915837	0.075	0.1982922	0.1776362	0.264	-2.009966	1.443236	0.164
WGI Government Effectiveness	-217.8642	74.5223	0.003	1.918671	0.6819959	0.005	0.3998565	0.2694229	0.138
WGI Regulatory Quality	1.924293	0.6962544	0.006	0.9764786	0.2149173	0	1.835143	0.6895746	0.008
Constant	-217.8642	74.5223	0.003	0.1982922	0.1776362	0.264	-231.2776	77.30467	0.003
N	2142			2142			2142		
Est. R2	0.3925			0.4004			0.3934		



Table 6 Overseas Development Aid

	UNGC (2002–2012)		UNFCCC (2005–2014)	
	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P	Coef. (Std. Err.)	P
WGI Voice and Accountability	1.0415 (.4224)	.014	2.4315 (.625)	.000
V-Dem CS Particip. (aggregate)	–2.2015 (1.1672)	.059	–2.8153 (1.222)	.021
Log GDP per capita	1.6961 (.6409)	.008	2.9046 (.9791)	.003
World Bank Net ODA (millions)	.00011 (.0002)	.575	–.0001 (.0002)	.657
Year	.1091 (.0367)	.003	.2057 (.0961)	.032
Log Population	1.0048 (.2197)	.000	1.8084 (.3875)	.000
USA	32.2324 (1.5689)	.000	96.1376 (2.6838)	.000
Year 2009			2.5497 (.7881)	.001
FCCC Host			12.9027 (5.1943)	.013
Per GDP CO2			.0055 (.0013)	.000
Fossil Fuel Consumption			–.0422 (.0105)	.000
WGI Government Effectiveness	–1.0126 (.492)	.040		
WGI Regulatory Quality	.5286 (.3998)	.186		
Constant	–238.1072 (72.49)	.001	–445.9941 (190.86)	.019
N	2142		1325	
Est. R2	.4020		.6497	

without checking each organization individually, we only test here the UNGC data, which is catalogued by the UNGC itself (organizations have to specify their type when they join). Three versions are tested above: the first is only NGOs (local and global). The second is the list which appears in the main body of the paper, which is NGOs, Labour Unions (local and global), Foundations, and Academia. The third has Business Associations (local and global) added to list 2.

Based on UNGC data only, it does appear that the type of CSO we are talking about matters: NGOs appear to have different dynamics driving UNGC participation than other actors. While the addition of Business Associations to our mid-range CSO set (model 3) creates only minor changes from our original model (model 2),



Table 7 What counts as a CSO?

	UNGC NGOs			UNGC NGOs, Labor, Found, Acad			UNGC NGOs, Plus Business Associations		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P	Coef.	Std. Err.	P
e_wbgi_vae	0.7686994	0.331509	0.02	1.039417	0.4230353	0.014	1.078099	0.4464641	0.016
v2x_cspart	-0.0958388	0.8083435	0.906	-2.104214	1.124565	0.061	-2.130134	1.192097	0.074
loggdppc	0.5917619	0.3311103	0.074	1.67089	0.6404867	0.009	1.729077	0.6564517	0.008
logPopulation	0.6489383	0.1274074	0	1.026062	0.2222856	0	1.107076	0.2312915	0
year	0.2052668	0.101297	0.043	0.1120262	0.0376095	0.003	0.1224264	0.0407991	0.003
US	61.58141	0.8506814	0	32.149	1.567677	0	32.39721	1.612232	0
e_wbgi_gee	0.5917619	0.3311103	0.074	1.67089	0.6404867	0.009	1.729077	0.6564517	0.008
e_wbgi_rqe	0.6489383	0.1274074	0	1.026062	0.2222856	0	1.107076	0.2312915	0
Constant	0.2052668	0.101297	0.043	0.1120262	0.0376095	0.003	0.1224264	0.0407991	0.003
N	2142			2142			2142		
Estimated R2	.5115			.4022			.3896		

the exclusion of all but NGOs (model 1) lends very different results. As can be seen from the progression of the model, as we add other types of CSOs and then Business Associations to the group counted, the effect size of Voice and Accountability goes up: .789 more NGOs, 1.04 more CSOs, and 1.08 more CSOs + Biz joining per year per 1-point increase in the WGI Voice and Accountability score. In addition, the effect of the 'CS Participation Environment' variable changes: while it appears to be insignificant for only traditional NGOs, once the range of possible organizations is widened, the civil society participatory environment variable becomes weakly significant and the effect size increases dramatically, by 2 CSOs per country-year. This raises a paradox: why would civil society participation in politics not matter to whether NGOs join the UNGC, but it would matter (negatively) to other CSO actors? We invite further reflection upon these results, and more research on the varying motivations for GGI participation from different types of civil society actors.

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